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PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC CONTROL IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA 
The following pages r-present a summary of some aspects of economic 
control in traditional African societies, some problems associated with 
economic change in such societies and a brief description of emergent 
patterns of economic authority. 
The author's intention is to use this material as part of a longer 
analysis of economic change in Africa. In this longer study the ideas here 
presented will be preceded by chapters dealing with the physical environment, 
the nature cf productive activity and the application of economic analysis 
in the traditional contexts, and the economic impact of colonial rule. 
It is to be followed by an analysis of two-sector growth models, capital 
accumulation models and foreign trade models—all applied to the African 
situation. 
Economic.Control in Traditional Societies 
In traditional African cultures the economic efforts of most 
individuals are devoted to the production of subsistance goods far themselves 
and their immediate kin. In this effort they are ordinarily directed by 
their family head who is usually the eldest male. These economic units often 
include more than just a nuclear family (a man, wife and immature offspring). 
There are frequently several wives, and one or more ctdult offspring with their 
children may- remain. And these may be joined by other kin as well. 
The family head allocates land and cattle and gives general 
direction as to times of planting and harvesting. He directs movements of 
the homestead and settles disputes which arise between members. Within such 
general authority bounds, individual members .are likely:to function with 
considerable autonomy. 
Such family groups are subject to outside "political" authority. 
Land is allocated by a chief or by some other individual with political power 
or, in some societies, by a group of elders or an assembly of all adult males. 
Though ultimate ownership of land is generally viewed as communal, the right 
of individuals to peaceful possession is ordinarily not disturbed. 
Such societies usually operate with no formal market for labor. 
Those working outside their immediate family units do so to fulfill kinship 
or marriage obligations or else are engaged in short-term projects to be 
repaid in kind on a reciprocal basis. When individuals need the assistance 
of others as for the construction of a new house, neighbours lend a hand. 
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They receive a meal and beer for their efforts and expect reciprocation from 
the persons Yfhom they, help when the need is reversed. Long term agreements 
to provide labor for another are usually associated with kinship or marriage 
ties and might involve adoption .or (in former times) slave status. 
There are in the traditional societies individuals who devote part of 
their time to basketry, weaving or dying, and there may be full-time 
blacksmiths or canoe makers. But relatively little of the total output is 
produced by individuals who are occupational specialists. Trade with 
outsiders—as for iron or salt—involves only a small part of the total 
economic endeavor and terms of exchange may remain fixed over extended 
periods of time. Even in those societies in which markets are large and 
formally constituted they tend to relate only to the marginal needs of 
people. An Ibo market has been described thus: 
A stranger going round to a number of Ibo markets 
is apt to have the impression that thousands of people 
are buying and selling minute quantities of the same 
things. Rows of women seem to have trays or baskets • 
with more or less the same miscellaneous collection of 
small objects—little leaf packets of mashed oil bean, 
a 'few red peppers, • half a dozen matches, some sliced 
cassava. But in fact the markets are to a certain extent 
specialised in the' sense that one is reputed good for meeat 
or livestock, another for pots, another for yams and so.on.. 
There is a constant flow of .food stuffs such as yam from 
the less densely populated areas in to those with a.heavy, 
population, the return being partly in palm oil. 
The women are the great petty traders, spending much 
time and energy for what must often be a very small profit. 
But even a few heads of cowries are worth having a profit 
when life is on a modest scale, particularly when the 
gaining cf them invol/es the pleasures of the market. 
(Green, 1947, pp.38-S). 
Institutionalized patterns of gift-giving based on kinship, marriage 
or friendship are common and supplement the efforts of individual families 
to provide for themselves. Generosity is widely condoned; selfishness is 
frequently condemned. Patterns of gift giving are supplemented with 
ceremonial obligations. In the past goods, were not infrequently acquired 
by raiding. 
In those societies in which the holders of political authority were 
specialized as such, the rules of the society provided for transfers of goods 
and services to them. The system for-gathering tribute might be simple and 
direct or might involve an elaborate and hierarchically arranged network of 
assessment and collection. Th3 holders of political power sometimes amassed 
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substantial wealth. It was frequently similar in kind to that possessed by 
their subjects, though in larger quantity. Often the wealth of the political 
leaders was viewed as being held in trust for the use of the entire society 
in time of need. There was a wide variety of social limitations placed on 
political power holders and these and the personalities of the office 
occupants affected the use or abuse cf their economic power. 
^uhere there were no political specialists, though affluence might 
be widely regarded as desirable, accumulations tended to be institutionally 
proscribed. 
Restrictions on Economic Change Inherent in Traditional Controls 
Given the prevailing conditions of resource availability and technical 
knowledge, economic growth in the traditional context would appear as the 
process of increasing output which accompanies population growth. This was 
likely to occur with no appreciable increase in per capita capital formation 
or in individual productivity. Changes in the relative wealth positions of 
participating families were limited by institutionalized demands for 
redistribution and by obligations to share with varying numbers of others. 
The traditional societies often evidenced suspicion and hostility 
toward strangers and there was considerable stress on the maintenance of 
group solidarity and internal integration. This was compatible with social 
emphasis on military strength, respect for established authority within the 
family, and, sometimes, with respect for designated holders of political or 
religious power. 
European contact meant that alternative goals became attainable 
including many related to economic performance. But economic change could 
not occur without the modification of established social institutions which 
were Intricately interconnected with traditional goals. Militarism and 
entrenched attitudes of suspicion and hostility toward neighboring societies 
remained. These could impair trade, joint undertakings and the acceptance of 
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innovations long after ultimate political control had been assumed by the 
colonial administrators. 
Traditional institutions which functioned to implement political 
authority patterns could impose obstacles to economic change. For the new 
forces which offered a potential increase in economic productivity 
necessarily altered the prevailing distribution of inter-personal power. 
Links between political authority and economic power were common. Thus wealth 
and a dominant position in trade could provide the basis for the power of an 
Ashanti king (Manoukian, 1950, p.18) or a Duala chieftain (Ardener, 1956, p.79). 
Before European rule the Oba of Benin held a monopoly of the exportation of 
slaves, ivory, palm kernels and pepper from his kingdom (Bradbury, 1957, p.25). 
And the chief of the Yao exercised exclusive control over the exchange 
between his people and coastal traders. (Tew, 1950, p. 15). 
Similarly there were political rules which restricted certain 
members of a society from designated types of economic activity. A subordinate 
caste might, for example, be prohibited from possession of productive cattle 
as in Ankole (Taylor, 1962, p.106). And attempts to preserve elements of 
traditional power could reduce the availability of physical resources for 
economic purposes. Thus the transfer of land is reported to have been 
impaired by the power of tribal chiefs among the Bunyoro (Burke, 1964, p.93.) 
/ 
But traditional institutions functioning to implement established 
political power were not the only impediments to change. Attitudes toward 
wealth accumulation could interfere with the development of a commercial 
psychology. Among the Congolese Lele the traditional system of selection for 
social rewards on the basis of seniority was said to continue to dampen 
individual achievement motivation long after contact with outside influence 
(Douglas, 1963, pp.2, 5l). Ana Df the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia it was 
said: "The purely possessive attitude to property with all its concomitant 
virtues, such as thrift, foresight, or self-reliance, are not inculcated 
in the Bemba child and would probably unfit him for life in his society" 
(Richards, 1939, p.200). 
Thus it is not surprising to find in Africa evidence of retarded 
response to economic motivation despite the introduction of improved,currency 
systems whieh could supply both a media of exchange and a store of value and 
despite the multitude of new opportunities which to varying degrees were 
being made available. There are examples, of low levels of consumer wants; 
newly available supplies failing to generate new demand; money acquired 
only to satisfy specific wants; rising output prices not stimulating increased 
productive efforts; and customary prices prevailing despite changes in 
conditions of supply and demand. These characteristics are evidenced, 
for example, in accounts of the Fulani, Arusha, and Zande in Bohannan and 
Dalton (1962, pp.359, 441, 553) and conparable statements regarding Ankole 
(Taylor, 1962, p.113), the Bwamba (Winter, 1955, p.43), Chiga (Edel, 1957, p.107) 
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Nuba (Nadel, 1947, pp.73-6) and Wolof, (Gamble, 1957, p.74). 
The Disruption of Traditional Institutions 
Insofar as new economic opportunities were adopted, they were 
accompanied by strains on the institutional fabric of the traditional 
societies. This could result for example, from the acceptance of a new 
productive technique as when the introduction of the plow and its requirement 
of male labor disrupted traditional patterns of work allocation among the 
Ndebele (Kuper, 1959, p.59). And opportunities to find employment outside 
the confines of the traditional society weakened dependence upon one's father-
and hence the father's authority as reported for the Chiga (Edel, 1957, p.35), 
the Pulbe (Hopen, 1962,pp.117-8), the Kipsigis (Peristiany, 1939, p.95), 
the Nuba (Nadel, 1947, p.51l), and the Toro (Taylor, 1962,pp.67-8). 
Economic changes' also affected established patterns of political 
authority. The prohibition of warfare reduced the importance of military 
prowess as a means for achieving status and reduced dependence an militarily 
strong leaders who had previously insured the safety of the people. This has 
been reported for the Bwamba (Winter, n.d., p. 241), the Ngoni (Gann, 1950, p. 73), 
and the Kipsigis (Pearn, 1961, p.227). The commutation of tribute 
payments from labor to cash limited the political power of Bunyoro chiefs 
(Burke, 1964, p.103), and new sources of economic wealth were used as a basis 
for power to challenge traditional authority as among the Chiga 
(Edel, 1957, p.109). Sometimes African populations were moved by the 
expatriate administrators from their traditional homelands to "native 
reserves" as, for example, in South Africa, the Rhodesias and Kenya and the 
impact of disruptive forces was thereby intensified. 
In general there seems to have been a difference evidenced in 
susceptibility to social disintegration between societies with formalized 
and those with informally organized political structures. 
In those societies which lacked political formalization, political 
power was in the hands of individuals or groups whc were not,political 
specialists. These traditionally acted on a non-hierarchical basis to define 
social goals, allocate prestige and resources to facilitate attainment cf 
the goals, and control deviant behavior. When the colonial administrators 
introduced new social objectives and naw channels of administration and 
adjudication, such innovations necessarily disrupted the fragile balance 
previously maintained in the traditional patterns of power limitation 
and authority distribution. The apparatus whereby political power was 
exerted from within kinship, village or age-set structures was interfered 
with and ultimately destroyed. Individuals were deprived of rights, 
duties and powers. Other individuals (indigenous or foreign) were appointed 
to wield power and administer new procedures. These others sought to attain 
new objectives through new means. Hence the scope and character of their 
authority could not be tailored to fit compatibly with the con^licated web of 
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interrelated social structures of the traditional societies. The fragile 
pattern of traditional institutional interrelationships which had been based 
on common acceptance of social values rather than on formal legal 
sanctions underwent widespread and thorough disruption. (See Fortes and 
Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp.15-6; MLddleton and Tait, 1958, pp.25-6; 
Leyy, 1966, p.311.) 
In purely economic terms the result of such disruptive contact was 
likely to prove advantageous. The extensive destruction of traditional 
institutions could remove major impediments to the acceptance of new 
educational standards, the adaptation of new techniques, and the acquisition 
of new goals for occupational performance, status, and consumption. 
This might be evidenced from accounts of rapid economic change among the 
Ibo (Forde and Scott, 1946, p.74), the Iteso (Burke, 1964, p.124), 
the Kipsigis (Manners, 1962.pp.500f). and the Tonga (Colson, 1962, p.219). 
On the other hand there are examples of politically uncentralized 
societies which maintained militant resistance to the intrusion of European 
culture. When permitted by circumstances to remain in relative isolation, 
such societies represent some of the most economically backward communities 
on the continent (see Schneider, 1959). 
Those societies with greater formality in their political power 
structures had greater ability to withstand the political innovations. 
Individuals that possessed recognized political power in the traditional 
context were nearly always utilized to facilitate the work of the expatriate 
administrators. The disruption of traditional behavior patterns was 
lessened in those instances in which the colonial administrations were 
intentionally solicitous of the institutions which they encountered as when 
the concept of "indirect rule" was successfully implemented. 
The Continuation of Traditional Patterns of Control 
Several emergent patterns of economic control might be identified 
in African societies following contact with European culture. In the first 
place there are widespread instances of the continuation of traditional 
economic controls with relatively minor modifications to accommodate a 
limited number of new products, techniques and channels of distribution. 
Often new crops could be produced and new systems of marketing 
utilized involving techniques which were long familiar in the cultivation of 
traditional food crops and which required a minimum of contact with 
outsiders. Most cocoa production in Africa provides evidence of this type 
of agricultural change. The industry was developed on the continent since 
the last decade of the 1800's almost entirely by African labor and initiative. 
In an extended account of the development of cocoa farming in Ghana, 
Polly Hill notes that the origination of the cocoa farms evidenced.a high 
degree of purposeful activity aimed specifically at the creation of 
economically productive capital. Moreover, the farmers showed themselves 
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innovating in the development af institutional structures to facilitate 
the extention of credit and the expanding purchase of real property. 
But the ties with the traditional culture were strong: 
"the migratory process derives much of its strength and 
inpetus from the fact that it is firmly based on 
'"traditional organization. ' Jural corporateness and mutual 
'insurance' for the whole group are provided by the 
lineage structure . . . „ Ties with the past were 
not broken and the structure of society in the 
homeland remained, I think, basically unchanged." 
(1963, pp. 2-5) 
Similar developments took place in various regions of the continent 
in the production of coffee and cotton,. In addition there was often an 
expansion of traditional crops—oil palms, groundnuts, maize—as commercial 
outlets developed. Thus much of Africa's economic growth and much of her 
capital formation has taken place through agricultural expansion which 
involved little change in productive method and few institutional modifications. 
When the process of commercial expansion occurred in this way within the 
general context of the traditional culture, forces tending to disrupt the 
established way of life might be considerably softened as individuals were 
confronted with a relative narrow range of new experiences. 
In terms of prospects for growth of per capita income in Africa, 
change via this rouce had disadvantages. The economic potential is largely 
dependent on export prospects which have proved to be unreliable in the 
short run and which in the long run are probably not adequate in themselves 
to provide a rising standard of living for a rapidly expanding population. 
Moreover, expansion by this means involves a minimum of subsidiary benefits 
from the adoption of new technology since the techniques employed are 
generally similar to those previously in use. Finally, such changes have 
engendered only a relatively slight multiplier effect since there was little 
potential for expanding the domestic output of consumer goods in response 
to an increase in purchasing power. 
To the extent that such an expansion from the traditional sector might 
provide an impetus to the development of processing industries and trade 
facilities, these would offer greater opportunities for the employment of 
new techniques and would thus provide a greater potential for productivity 
gains in diverse areas. Such, however, involves the cost of a more complete 
break with the traditional cultures. 
Economic Control by Expatriates 
Expatriates in Africa have dix-ected economic activity by virtue of 
their holding economic power on the one hand and by virtue of "their holding 
political authority on the other. 
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Expatriate administrators in their political capacity were in a 
position to settle disputes and shape new goals for the societies which they 
governed. In large part these goals were economic. 
Thus the colonial administrators directed the use of indigenous labor 
for the erection of administrative buildings, schools and hospitals. 
They supervised the construction of roads, bridges and dock facilities. 
In response to an expanding market for agricultural output, they encouraged 
the use of more productive crops and cultivation techniques and directed 
the disposal of outputs. They hired workers on wage contract in some 
instances and used forced laboj* conscriptions in others. When labor was 
supplied according to contract they applied various indirect pressures to 
encourage participation. 
The use of forced labor for railway construction occurred in various 
parts of colonial Africa including the Belgian Congo, French ¥est Africa, 
French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons, Tqgo, Nigeria and Kenya. 
The high mortality rate among the displaced workers used in railway-
construction evidenced the Y/orst abuses of the system of forced labor in 
Africa. (See Hailey, 1957, pp.1546-73.) Compulsory labor was utilized 
for other activities—especially for road building and porterage—but was 
administered with greater legal restraint and for shorter periods,.. 
As railway construction declined after the opening decades of the century, 
and as voluntary labor became more readily available, the use of forced 
labor contingents became less common. It remained for use in emergencies 
and for special communal activities and Y/as resorted to in a fairly wide 
variety of situations during the Second World War. The Portuguese 
administration remained subject to criticism for its misuse of forced labor 
longer than the other metropolitan povrers. 
Various agricultural projects were sponsored by the colonial 
governments. Research was conducted to find high yielding varieties of 
crops and livestock, more productive cultivation and fertilization 
techniques, and improved methods for fighting insects and crop diseases. 
In some areas members of the indigenous communities Y/ere required to 
participate in promising lines of agricultural activity and private 
companies sometimes were granted concessions to assist in the furtherance 
of the schemes. 
Thus in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa the 
production of cotton and rubber by native workers was made conpulsory. 
Companies holding monopoly rights for distribution and export directed 
cultivation practices, compelled crcp rotation and experimented with the 
use of mechanized equipment. T h e s y s t em was subject to abuse, especially 
in the early years of its application, and Y/as the .object of international 
condemnation. Similar events occurred in the Belgian Congo in respect to 
the cultivation of coffee, oil palms and cotton. The use of forced labor 
gradually lessened in response to public criticism and as the need declined 
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due to the growing effectiveness of commercial incentives. Cocoa, which 
was introduced into French West Africa under government compulsion, soon 
became an economic success and was expanded voluntarily. (Thompson and 
Adloff, 1958, pp.318, 484; 1960, pp.12-16, 177, 190, 195; Hailey, 1957, 
pp. 1370ff.) 
Some agricultural development schemes sponsored by the colonial 
governments involved the resettlement of agricultural workers and their 
families. Some included major irrigation efforts as in South Africa, 
Rhodesia, Sudan and Mali. Some proved only questionably successful' in 
terms of income generation, and some such as the Tanganika groundnut scheme 
were rather spectacular failures. Many, however, have been continued in 
expanded and modified form in post-independence situations. 
(3. iz* g r* "fc 1 v 
Economic control not^associated with political power was provided 
by expatriates as well. 
European settlers in Africa established farms of varying size 
producing maize, wheat, sugar, fruit and livestock in South Africa; 
maize, tobacco and tea in Rhodesia; various field crops, coffee and livestock 
in Kenya; coffee in the eastern sections of the Congo and in the Central 
African Republic; bananas in the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Cameroon. 
European settlement in Angola and Mozambique, encouraged by the government of 
Portugal, has tended to be comprised principally of small holdings of 
relatively low productivity. They produce a variety of crops including sugar, 
coffee, sisal and tea. 
Larger plantations directed by commercially employed European 
administrators have been widely important in African agricultural production. 
Large scale plantings of oil palms, coffee and cocoa have been undertaken 
in the Congo under the auspices of large expatriate companies including 
Unilever. Extensive rubber producing capacity has been developed by the 
Firestone Corporation in Liberia. And a single company accounts for about 
one quarter of Angola's coffee output. Large commercial ventures are 
involved in the production of sisal in Tanzania, tea in Uganda, oil palms, 
rubber and bananas in the Cameroons. 
New varieties of outputs, new techniques and organizational methods, 
and new opportunities for the employment of indigenous labor have 
accompanied these efforts. The contacts weaJcened the ties of the African 
participants to their traditional environments. But much of the work required 
of the Africans required little new skill attainment, and to the extent that 
work on the European--or Asian-run farms was technologically similar to that 
on the traditional farms the impetus to economic change was reduced. 
In mining, manufacturing and commerce European and Asian immigrants 
to Africa tended to assume positions of organizational control and 
administrative dominance as new opportunities developed. They possessed the 
psychological attitudes and the knoT/ledge of productive and distributional 
techniques which were most needed for economic expansion on the continent. 
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Their rapid acquisition of commercial power was almost immediately 
accompanied by their efforts to erect barriers to the entry of potential 
competitors. The erection of barriers applied both to fellow expatriates 
and the indigenous population. But with respect to the latter the 
economic motive to restrict was reinforced by differences in language, 
culture, observed productivity rates and by racial prejudice. The will to 
erect barriers to the entry cf competition is a problem which inevitably 
accompanies free•enterprise. The problem for Africa was aggravated by the 
fact that ultimate political power frequently lay in the hands of individuals 
who often proved willing to reinforce the barriers rather than to limit them. 
A second disadvantage of expatriate control lay in the tendency for-
profits to be sent overseas and thus' made unavailable for local investment. 
The shortage of investment capital remains a major impediment to economic 
growth in Africa. 
Indigenous Private Enterprise in a Hen-traditional Environment 
The goal of economic maximisation and the will to establish 
productive capital can be acquired by the members of a society even where 
pre-existing institutions and capabilities have been associated with 
different social goals-, 
The establishment of rev/ social goals is facilitated when individuals 
are removed from the influences of their traditional environment. This may 
occur, for example, when migration from a rural vilage to a commercial, 
urban setting involves a more or less complete severance cf traditional ties. 
The degree of severance varies widely with the length of time involved, the 
distance moved, the nature of the traditional authority patterns, the degree 
of reinforcement from associates, the nature of the employment secured,-
the personalities of the migrants, etc. The degree to which the traditional 
background provided familiarity with commercial exchanges and economic 
incentives doubtless affects the pace of adaptation to economic modernization 
as well. 
When improved techniques are available to individuals operating in 
an environment of private property rights with economic opportunities subject 
to little central political direction their efforts may be acconpanied by 
rapidly rising productivity rates. 
In reference to contemporary Africa the wisdom a?- reliance on private 
initiative to generate economic growth has been questioned. It has been 
suggested, for example, that the rate of capital- acsumulation under 
conditions of "free enterprise" may be inadequate to sustain even a minimally 
acceptable rate of national economic growth. 
In Africa today the flow cf. savings forthcoming from the private 
efforts of individual? undergoing the transition from traditional to more 
"modern" patterns cf, living is likely to be.small. When one's level of ' 
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consumption spending is well behind others of whom one is informed, there 
will be considerable motivation to expand consuirption expenditures as rapidly 
as income rises. The problem is made more critical by the fact that a large 
part of the investment which does occur under these circumstances is likely 
to take the form of improved residences which contribute little to 
increased economic productivity. 
Under such circumstances the rate of capital formation accompanying 
the process of "modernization" may be less than that accomplished by 
indigenous agriculturalists in a traditional or near traditional environment. 
Other serious problems have been identified as associated with 
economic growth under a system of private enterprise. The distribution of 
economic rewards under such a system will tend to be in accordance with the 
effectiveness of the productive contribution of the factors over which 
various individuals exercise control. But these contributions will be 
determined not only by personal skill, strength and merit but by the caprices 
of economic fortune. And the long recognized problems associated with 
monopolies and trade restraints are widely evidenced on the continent. 
There is some suggestion that the distribution of rewards forthcoming from 
economic growth under a capitalist system may not be socially acceptable 
in contemporary Africa. And many political leaders have pronounced the need 
for government action to guard against excessive distributional inequality. 
A third problem is associated with economic growth which takes place-
through individual initiative accompanied by the the legal rules of private 
property rights. This is the fact that many traditional institutions will be 
subjected by such a process to a maximum degree of destruction and this 
implies a high level cf psychic costs to be borne by the participants. 
Governmental Control of Economic Effort 
A considerable interest in the control of economic activity by 
governmental units exists in most African countries. This is not surprising 
given the nature of political direction during the colonial era, the 
widespread need for social overhead expenditures including education, and 
the fear cf reliance on private enterprise. 
Whereas the shortage of technical and administrative talent 
comprises the most serious obstacle to Africa's economic growth, governments 
have the best opportunity to negotiate for the services of knowledgeable 
individuals from overseas. Moreover, African governments frequently have 
important advantages in securing the services of indigenous personnel as well. 
Ihereas shortages of savings and capital equipment constitute obvious 
economic handicaps, governments can "force" saving through exertion of their 
tax powers. Similarly the government has an obvious advantage over most 
private business units in the negotiation of foreign loans. 
Governments can devise redistributional schemes in accordance with 
the social will. And it has been argued by many that central direction of 
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investment and of the production and distribution processes will result in 
greater efficiency of factor use, quicker access of economies of scale and 
hence an accelerated growth rate. 
However, the extent to which a government can direct a country's 
economic activity is determined by the breadth of its control over the 
society's resources. Table 1 attempts to suggest the extent of governmental 
control over economic resources in 16 countries. It shows general government 
revenues as a percent of gross domestic product for the six Subsaharan 
countries for which data were available in the 1966 Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics. High and low percentages axe given for the period 
1958-65, or for the part of this period for which data were available. 
Corresponding percentages for six South American countries and for France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are also included. 
The data suggest the fact that in low-income countries it is difficult 
for governments to appropriate a large proportion of the nation's income. 
Much economic activity is not commercialized and many of the people are 
extremely poor. In low-income countries, moreover, the need for spending 
on social services—including education—for a rapidly growing population 
demands most of the resources which the governments can assemble. These 
factors suggest that direct participation by African governments in economic 
activity is at present subject to important financial limitations. 
Table 1. General'Government Revenues as a Percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product: High and Low Percentages for the Period 1958-1965 (or as 
Indicated) for 16 Countries 
Country Range 
Nigeria (1958-62) 11, .8 % - 14. .5 % 
Togo (1963-4) 12, .7 - 13. .3 
Sierra Leone (1963-4) 13, .3 - 14, .4 
Zambia IVr, .5 - 26, .7 
South Africa ' 16 ,0 - 19, .5 
Rhodesia (1958-63) 13, , 1 - 22. .0 
Colombia 10, . o - 12. ,0 
Peru 12. 2 - 16. ,0 
Bolivia 13. - 15. ,4 
Chile 20. ,0 - 24. .0 
Equador 20. ,2 - 23. ,8 
Uruguay 23. ,0 - 27. 8 
United States 24. 0 - 26. 9 
United Kingdom 7 - 29. 3 
France - 33, 1 - 37. 9 
Germany 34. 9 - 36. 7 
- 13 -
Ardener, Edwin, 
Bohannan, Paul, and 
Dalton, George, eds., 
Bradbury, R.E. , 
Burke, Fred G., 
Buxton, J.C., 
Colson, Elizabeth, 
Douglas, Mary, 
Edel, May Mandelbaum, 
Forde, Daryll, and 
Scott, Richenda, 
Fortes, Meyer, and 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E., 
Gamble, David P., 
Gann, L.H., 
Green, M.M., 
Hailey (Lord), 
Hopen, C. Edward, 
Kuper, Hilda, et al., 
Levy, Marion J., Jr., 
Manners, R.A., 
References 
Coastal Bantu of the Cameroons (London: 
International African Institute, 1956). 
Markets in Africa (Northwestern University 
Press, 1962). 
The Benin Kingdom (London: International 
African Institute, 1957). 
Local Government and Politics in Uganda 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1954). 
Chiefs and Strangers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963). 
The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962). 
The Lele of Kasai (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963). 
The Chiga of Western Uganda (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1957). 
The Native Economies of Nigeria (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1946). 
African Political Systems (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1940). 
The Wolof of Senegambia (London: International 
African Institute, 1957). 
The Birth of a Plural Society (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1958). 
Ibo Village Affairs (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, Ltd., 1947). 
An African Survey, Revised 1956 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1957). 
The Pastoral Fulbe Family in Gwandu 
(London: Oxford University Press for 
International African Institute, 1958). 
The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Hhodesia 
(London: International African Institute, 1955). 
Modernization and the Structure of Societies, 
Vol. I. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966). 
"Land Use, Trade and the Growth of Market 
Economy in Kipsigis Country" in Bohannan and 
Dalton,(1962), 

This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
